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Education Finance Reform Litigation
and Separation of Powers: Kentucky
Makes Its Contribution
INTRODUCTION
"We are ever mindful of the immeasurable worth of education
to our state and its citizens, especially to its young people."'
In 1989, Kentucky joined the ranks of states that have con-
fronted the constitutionality of their educational finance systems .2
These constitutional challenges have involved concerns with edu-
cational opportunity being dependent on where children live; since
funding commonly is tied to property values,, and since property
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989).
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Parker
v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870
(D. Minn. 1971); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem.,
397 U.S. 44 (1970); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub
nom., Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz.
1973) (en banc); DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano
v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en banc);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46
(Ill. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck
v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d
457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Helena Elementary School Dist.
No. 1, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont.
1974); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973);
Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct.
App.), appeal dismissed mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390
N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair School Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla.
1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979);
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Edgewood Indep. School Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71
(Wash. 1978) (en banc); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash.
1974) (en banc), rev'd, 585 P.2d 391 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.
Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County School Dist.
No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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values fluctuate greatly based on location, unequal per pupil ex-
penditures often result. 3
During the past twenty years, constitutional challenges to school
funding methods have been mounted in almost half of the states. 4
The importance of state decisions on education questions is ampli-
fied by San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,5
where the United States Supreme Court held that education is not
a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. 6 The
Court's decision pushed school reform into the state courts for
litigants concerned that school funding disparity causes unequal
educational opportunities. 7
School reform litigation, which has been divided into three
distinct waves by commentators, 8 has offered a wide range of
arguments, with varying degrees of success. 9 These cases have
proceeded along three lines: the Rodriguez "rational basis" test as
adopted by state courts; 10 education as a fundamental right subject
to state equal protection guarantees; 1" and education as a funda-
mental right based on state education clauses, where grossly une-
qual per pupil expenditures result in a facially unconstitutional
I As one commentator noted, although local school districts, with the exception of
Hawaii, receive both state and federal aid, much of the money comes from tax rates that
are locally set based on the value of real property in the districts. This situation results in
unequal per pupil funding. See Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation,
19 J. L. & EDUC. 219, 219 n.2 (Spring 1990).
Maximum rates may be set by state statute, foreclosing residents from providing higher
tax funds. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.475 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [herein-
after KRS]. Funding differences among local school districts in Kentucky showed great
disparity. "The assessed valuation of property per pupil ... ranged from $244,305.32 for
Beechwood Independent... to only $29,806.67 for McCreary County." Brief for Appellees
at 6, Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)(No. 88-SC-804-
TG).
Three distinct methods have been tried in attempts to remedy funding disparities: flat
rate grant foundation programs, power equalization plans, and need based foundation
programs. See Thro, supra, at 219 n.3.
4 See Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions
in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. Rav. 1639, 1640 (1989).
5 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
6 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
See Thro, supra note 3, at 219-26; Note, Litigating State Constitutional Rights to
an Adequate Education and the Remedy of State Operated Schools, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 779,
780 (1989-90).
8 Thro, supra note 3, at 219, 222.
9 Id.
10 See infra notes 48-112 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
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system. 12 Much of the individual states' inconsistent treatment of
the school funding issue may be traced to the different state con-
stitutional clauses 3 and the diverse methods of school financing
considered. '4
While attaining the goal of an equal education is a noble
pursuit, it may be argued that this goal is best served through the
political process, which recognizes the traditional concern of "local
control" in the education context.15 Nevertheless, when a state
legislature shirks its duty to provide an equal education, the courts
must exercise the judicial power of constitutional interpretation.' 6
However, by engaging in judicial activism in traditional fields of
legislative domain, such as education, state judiciaries leave them-
selves open to attack via principles of separation of powers includ-
ing the related political question doctrine.
This Note examines the history of school funding decisions
relating to the separation of powers doctrine. Part I provides a
brief background on the separation of powers doctrine and its
relationship to the political question doctrine.17 In Part II, this
Note examines Rodriguez, and state decisions following its analy-
sis.18 Part III discusses those state cases rejecting the Rodriguez
rationale. 9 Part IV explores recent state education cases. 20 Finally,
this Note concludes that Kentucky's contribution, Rose v. Council
for Better Education, Inc. ,21 reflects the proper balance between
separation of powers concerns and educational equality.22
,1 See infra notes 169-220 and accompanying text.
,1 See Note, supra note 4, at 1661-72.
" See generally supra note 3.
,1 The idea of local control has long been used as a justification for different school
funding programs; this argument was persuasive in Rodriguez. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50-
53; see also Note, supra note 7 (recognizing that there is room for debate as to who can
best govern the schools-local districts, the legislature, or the courts).
16 As one commentator has noted, the separation of powers doctrine in the federal
system should not preclude courts from "refashion[ing]" schools, prisons, and other such
administrative concerns, following the Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Horowitz,
Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, in TBE CouRTs:
SSPARATION OF PowERs 49 (Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference, 1983) (Sponsored
by Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation). It is still an open question as to
whether the loosening of doctrinal positions on separation of powers, standing, the political
question doctrine, etc., has done more harm than good. See id. at 49-68.
17 See infra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
'8 See infra notes 48-112 and accompanying text.
,1 See infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 169-220 and accompanying text.
21 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
2 See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
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I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINES
The framers of the constitution, influenced by political theorists
of the Age of Reason,23 formulated the doctrine of separation of
powers in American jurisprudence. Separation of powers refers to
both the division of government into three branches and the prin-
ciple of "checks and balances."24 In practice, separation of powers
analysis focuses on the differences in government functions among
the three branches, resulting in the need to keep the branches
separate .2  Resolution of separation of powers questions leads to a
"functional" approach or, according to Holmes and Cardozo, a
"judgment by labels." '26 At first glance, separation of powers anal-
ysis is deceptively simple. In evaluating education policy, the con-
clusion may be reached that this function is better left to the more
politically responsive legislature than the judiciary. This "judgment
by labels" ignores the fact that implementation of a government
program, like education, does not fit neatly under any one division
of government. 2 As one commentator has noted, in discussing the
problems of functional separation of powers analysis:
The inefficacy of resorting to a general notion of separation of
powers to resolve contests between ... branches of government
has long been demonstrated by our history .... [T]o resort to
the idea that there is a tripartite division of powers, legislative,
executive, and judicial, each term self-defining, is to deal with
phantasms. If we take the basic arguments usually asserted that
it is for the legislature to make the rules governing conduct, for
the executive to enforce those rules, and for the judiciary to apply
those rules in the resolution of justiciable contests, it soon be-
comes apparent that it is necessary to government that sometimes
the executive and sometimes the judiciary has to create rules, that
21 See Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592, 592 (1986).
24 Id. at 593.
1 See Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to the Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492-93 (1987). Professor Strauss
distinguishes between "functional" and "formal" approaches to separation of powers
questions. Under a "formal" analysis, the functions of the three branches of government
are thought incapable of being joined in a "shared" government powers system. A "func-
tional" approach attempts to classify government action as legislative, executive, or judicial.
Id.
, See Kurland, supra note 23, at 593.
27 Id. at 603.
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sometimes the legislature and sometimes the judiciary has to
enforce rules, and sometimes the legislature and sometimes the
executive has to resolve controversies over the rules. And these
variations became more imperative as government became more
invasive and complex.
The purpose of the doctrine was to protect individual liberty
from a centralized government. 29 However, the doctrine's impor-
tance has faded as protection of individual liberty has come, in
large part, from limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights.3 0 As a
theoretical underpinning of our republican form of government,
reasons for adherence to the separation of powers doctrine in the
modern era derive from "the rule of law," which "is the last best
hope for avoiding the arbitrary tyranny of government."' '3
While separation of powers remains a deeply rooted ideal fed-
erally, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "[T]he doctrine of
separation of powers embodied in the Federal Constitution is not
mandatory on the States. "32 Thus, education finance reform liti-
gation that centers on state constitutional law33 derives any sepa-
ration of powers constructions from state constitutional provisions.34
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held, "[Tihe separation of
powers doctrine is fundamental to Kentucky's tri-partite system of
government and must be 'strictly construed."'' 35 In Legislative Re-
search Commission v. Brown,36 the court rejected a call to construe
the doctrine liberally by distinguishing authority from states that
did not have the "unusually forceful" separation of powers lan-
guage of the Kentucky Constitution. 37
The court's meaning of "strict" construction is readily appar-
ent from the Brown decision. In Brown, the court examined sta-
28 Id.
21 Id. at 611.
30 Id.
'z Id. at 612.
Whelan v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 n.4 (1979). Generally, the concept that
federalism prohibits the Court from examining state separation of executive and judicial
powers is found in Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902). See also Note, Justice Without
Fear: Due Process and Separation of Executive and Judicial Powers in Sate Government,
94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1686-92 (1985) (arguing that the Dreyer doctrine does not completely
bar due process review of state executive and judicial powers).
3 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See generally CAL. CONST. art. III; KY. CONST. §§ 27-28; MD. CONST. art. 8; W.
VA. CoNsr. § 1 (separation of powers provisions).
" Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Ky. 1984).
36 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
" Id. at 910.
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tutes passed by the General Assembly that empowered the Legislative
Research Commission (LRC) to veto administrative regulations and
declared the LRC, "an independent agency of state government
... which is exempt from control by the executive branch and
from reorganization by the Governor." '38 The court considered
legislative and executive functions, strictly applying separation of
powers to hold the LRC statutes unconstitutional. 39 By examining
traditional functions of the legislature, executive, and judiciary,
the court's separation of powers analysis approached a "judgment
by labels." Nevertheless, commentary following Brown praised the
court's method, heralding the case as "Kentucky's Marbury v.
Madison. ',4
A functional approach to separation of powers is distinguished
from those instances when a court declines to examine a constitu-
tional issue by deferring to another branch, because it perceives
the judiciary as less competent to deal with an area of government
activity. This judicial deference, on such matters as education
policy,4' implicates the political question doctrine, 42 which has a
close relationship to separation of powers. As Justice Brennan
noted in Baker v. Carr,43 "The nonjusticiability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.""4
Further:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for re-
solving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. 45
38 KRS § 7.090(1).
31 Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 912.
, Snyder & Ireland, The Separation of Governmental Powers Under the Constitution
of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 Ky. L.J. 165, 207
(1984-85).
4' See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-53 (1973);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 790 (Md. 1983); Board of
Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643, 647 (1982); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 366 (Pa. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568, 582-83 (Wis. 1989).
42 Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031,
1031-35 (1985).
,' 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
41 Id. at 217.
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Without addressing academic concerns over the continued viability
of the political question doctrine, 46 in large measure, Justice Bren-
nan's approach can be phrased: Where in the three branches of
government does the constitutional issue reside? By any other
name, this analysis appears little different from a "functional"
approach to separation of powers. Indeed, when a court declines
to rule on educational guarantees because education policy is tra-
ditionally for the legislature, the court's concerns touch both the
separation of powers and political question doctrines. 47 For the
purposes of this Note, separation of powers broadly includes the
functional division of powers among the three branches of govern-
ment and the system of checks and balances implicated in the
political question doctrine.
II. HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM CASES: TE
RODRIGUEZ RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND ITS ADHERENTS
A. The Rodriguez Decision
In 1973, recognizing that education is "important" based on
Brown v. Board of Education,41 the Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, held that education is
neither an explicit nor an implicit fundamental right under the
United States Constitution.49 Had the Court found education to be
a fundamental right, Texas conceded that its funding system, 50
under attack in the case, could not withstand a "strict scrutiny"
41 Some academicians maintain that the political question doctrine has no viability,
while others differ. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1959)(arguing that courts may abstain only wheh the constitution
permits) with Redish, supra note 42, at 1031-33 (arguing that decisions in some cases can
be explained only by invoking doctrine).
"7 Professor Redish asserts that when a court says it lacks competence to render a
decision best left for the other branches, it is deferring to the professional judgment of the
other branches. See Redish, supra note 42, at 1056.
Redish faults courts for taking this easy out, rather than confronting difficult, sensitive,
constitutional issues. This approach works as an abdication of the courts' proper duty of
constitutional interpretation under the doctrine of judicial review. Id. at 1050-51.
"' The Court in Rodriguez, quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954), stated, "[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
41 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
" Id. at 4. Texas permitted a school district to impose an ad valorem tax on property
within the district in a Local Fund Assignment. Id.
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test under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
analysis.-"
The Court approached the specific question of school funding
constitutionality under a "rational basis" test, 52 by balancing a
"legitimate state interest" against the impact of the funding system
on a suspect class of "poor" students. However, the Court did
not find "poor" persons living in low property value districts to
be such a suspect class . 3 The court held that the Texas system of
public finance did not purposely discriminate, but was a product
of experimentation reflecting the beliefs of qualified educators and
legislators .54
In dicta, the court expressed great reluctance to invade taxation
and education, areas "reserved for the legislative processes of the
various states," noting specifically, "[We] do no violence to the
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our
hand. 5 5 Part of the Court's hesitance may be traced to the pop-
ularly held belief that education is best left to "home rule," local
control attuned to community values. 56 Moreover, the Court was
unwilling to assume that it could correctly second-guess state leg-
islators and educational experts of the fifty states by judicially
implementing funding reforms designed to improve educational
quality.57
The Rodriguez decision pushed school reform litigation into
state courts, to depend on state constitutional guarantees of equal
protection or state education clauses.58 The cases proceeding on
state constitutional grounds have had mixed results, with claims
based on either a combination of equal protection and education
clauses or solely upon education clauses. 59 As one commentator
indicates, the success of these challenges, in large part, has de-
'1 Id. at 16.
" A rational basis test questions whether a challenged state action bears a rational
relationship to furtherance of a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
53 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 21-22. A strict scrutiny test examines whether there is a
compelling state interest behind a challenged state action. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
'" Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
5 Id. at 58.
56 Id. at 50-53; see Note, supra note 7, at 799-800.
'7 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42.
" Thro, supra note 3, at 225.
5 Id. at 222. For an excellent discussion of state education and equal protection
clauses and their interplay in the field of school finance reform litigation, see also Note,
supra note 4.
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pended on the specific wording of the relevant education clauses. 60
Whether a state court finds education to be a fundamental right
correlates with the type of education clause at issue.6' In that
respect, some states have followed the Rodriguez equal protection
analysis in the state equal protection context.6 2 Significantly, those
state decisions recognized the Supreme Court's deference to state
legislatures in formulating education policy and found separation
of powers objections to a state constitutional right to education.6 1
B. State Decisions Applying Rodriguez
In Danson v. Casey,64 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court af-
firmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the state's edu-
cation funding system violated a state constitutional mandate that
the General Assembly "provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of public education." 65 Notably,
the "thorough and efficient" education clause involved is the same
type of clause that has brought the most favorable results to reform
litigants. 66 In Danson, where the complainants failed to allege legal
harm to a class of school children, the court found no cause of
action stated, and declined to find education a fundamental right
under this clause.67 Likewise, the court followed the Rodriguez
analysis by questioning whether the school funding legislation bore
a reasonable relation to the constitutional purposes of a "thorough
and efficient" education, and not "the reason, wisdom, or expe-
diency of the legislative policy with regard to education. '68
Recognizing that the legislature was in a better position to deal
with education policy, the court refrained from action, in part,
because of separation of powers. 69 In sum, the court declined to
define a "thorough and efficient" education where any rule the
court promulgated concerning education funding "would be the
rigid rule that each pupil must receive the same dollar expendi-
60 Note, supra note 4, at 1661-72.
61 Id.
62 See infra notes 64-104 and accompanying text.
63 Id.
61 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
' PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
66 See Note, supra note 4, at 1661.
67 Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d at 360, 367 (Pa. 1979).
- Id. at 366 (quoting Teachers' Tenure Act Cases, 197 A. 344, 352 (Pa. 1938)).
Id. at 367.
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tures. ' ' 70 From a judicial management viewpoint, the court felt that
such a rule would inadequately serve the needs of different school
districts, and more importantly, the future needs of school chil-
dren.7 '
Unlike the plaintiffs in Danson, who relied on a "thorough
and efficient" education clause, 72 the plaintiffs in Board of Edu-
cation, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 3 relied
on federal and state equal protection guarantees, as well as a state
education clause imposing a duty of maintaining "free common
schools," in seeking a declaratory judgment that the school funding
system was unconstitutional. 74 After disposing of the federal claim
under the authority of Rodriguez, the court applied the Rodriguez
"rational basis" test to the state claim.7 5 While the level of edu-
cation funding in New York exceeded most other states, there
remained a wide disparity in per pupil funding between districts. 76
Nevertheless, the court declined to find a state equal protection
violation noting, like the Rodriguez Court, that education is a high
priority, but not a fundamental right triggering heightened equal
protection analysis. 77 Instead, the court found the less strict "ra-
tional basis" test satisfied since the state gave an equal amount of
funds to each district, with the disparity in per pupil spending
coming from different district property tax bases .7
It has been recognized79 that cases like Nyquist, proceeding
under a "free and common schools" clause, which arguably im-
poses only a minimum duty on a state legislature, are distinguish-
able in many respects from those cases that utilize a "thorough
and efficient" education clause. 0 However, the Nyquist court noted
70 Id. at 366.
71 Id.
72 See supra note 65.
13 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
74 N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 1. This category of education clauses has produced the least
favorable results for school finance reform plaintiffs because of a "minimum education
obligation" rationale. Note, supra note 4, at 1661-62.
11 Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,
368, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 652 (1982).
76 Id. at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53. Even today, New York's per pupil spending
varies greatly-from $26,230 to $3,091. Hearing on H.R. 3850, The Fair Chance Act,
Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educ. of the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990).
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51.
71 Id. at 367-68, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52.
See generally Note, supra note 4 (grouping education clauses into four categories,
depending on the legislature's educational obligation).
10 Id. at 1661-62.
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that education is a concern of both the legislative and executive
branches . 1 Education involves taxation, a traditional legislative
function, and the dual executive/legislative roles of distributing
available state funds across all state programs.8 2 Further, the court
expressed the longstanding belief of the American people that a
public school education should reflect "local control.' '83 The mere
existence of wide disparity in per pupil expenditures did not over-
ride these concerns.
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Board of Education,8 4 found no fundamental
right to education under a "thorough and efficient" education
clause, and thus employed a rational basis test in a school funding
challenge.85 In a broadly worded lower court decision, education
was found to be a fundamental right and, therefore, equal per
pupil funding was constitutionally required.16 The lower court also
held that a "thorough and efficient" education clause required a
"system . . . full and complete by contemporary standards
throughout the state." 87
By extensively examining the history of the framers' intent
relating to changes in Maryland's education clause,8 the Hornbeck
court concluded that the clause did not demand a "uniform"
system, but rather that the legislature had a duty to provide "all
school districts . .. a basic public school education. ' 8 9 Rejecting
decisions from other "thorough and efficient" education clause
states which held per pupil funding disparities constitutionally im-
permissible, 9° the court followed Rodriguez and held that education
is not a fundamental right under the Maryland constitution, citing
" Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
'2 Id.
" Id. at 367-68, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52; see also supra note 14.
458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
, Horbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 782 (Md. 1983). That
constitution provides: "The General Assembly ... shall by Law establish throughout the
State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by taxation,
or otherwise, for their maintenance." MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 769.
, Id. at 767-68.
' while the 1864 Maryland Constitution called for simply a "uniform" system of
schools, it was subsequently amended in 1867. Specifically, some delegates thought the
phrase "efficient" required an "economical system." Additionally, the delegates expressed
concern that future details of the system "should be left to the Legislature . . . " Id. at
772-73.
0 Id. at 776.
91 Id. at 777-79.
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Danson and Nyquist as support for its decision. 9' In that regard,
the different wording of the respective educational clauses, "thor-
ough and efficient" versus "free common schools," was not sig-
nificant to the Maryland court's holding that education was no
more fundamental than other government services such as a right
to police or fire protection.9 2 Under the rational basis test, the
court decided that the values of "local control" were satisfactory.93
Notably, the Hornbeck court expressed concern over its inabil-
ity to deal effectively with the perceived deficiencies of the public
system. 94 While the court recognized the "central role of education
in ... society," it nonetheless admitted,
[l]t is not within the power or province of members of the
Judiciary to advance their own personal wishes or to implement
their own personal notions of fairness under the guise of consti-
tutional interpretation. The quantity and quality of educational
opportunities to be made available to the State's public school
children is a determination committed to the legislature or to the
people of Maryland through adoption of an appropriate amend-
ment to the State Constitution. 95
In 1989, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Kukor v. Grover,96
became the most recent adherent of the Rodriguez rational basis
test. Construing the Wisconsin education clause calling for educa-
tion "as nearly uniform as practical, ' 97 the court upheld dismissal
of a complaint alleging that unequal per pupil spending caused by
different local tax bases was constitutionally infirm.98 The court
found that the framers of the state constitution intended to provide
for a method of distribution of school funds; the "uniform"
provision was simply "to assure that the 'character' of instruction
was as uniform as practicable."99 This duty was met by minimum
statutory standards of teacher education, a minimum number of
school days, and a standard school curriculum.' °°
9, Id. at 778-79.
9 Id. at 785.
93 Id. at 788.
14 Id. at 790.
95 Id.
" 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
" WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3.
11 Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
9 Id. at 577.
'11 Id. at 577-78.
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Moreover, the court rejected an equal protection argument
under the Wisconsin constitution by applying a modified Rodriguez
rational basis test.101 The court recognized that "equal opportunity
for education" is a fundamental right under Wisconsin's equal
protection clause; however, where there was no complete denial of
education, the proper standard to be applied was the rational basis
test.10 The dichotomy between state and local control that existed
since the adoption of the constitution warranted application of this
lower test for spending disparities.103 Additionally, the court de-
clined to become a "super-legislature," deferring instead to the
legislative judgment in education, given the strong "political per-
ceptions and emotionally laden views" over the issue of equality
in education.' 4
C. The Place of the Danson-Nyquist-Hornbeck-Kukor Line in
School Finance Reform
The Maryland court, in Hornbeck, declined to follow the ex-
ample of other states that had construed "thorough and efficient"
education clauses to impart a fundamental right to education; 05
similarly, other courts have declined to follow Hornbeck. °6 Nev-
ertheless, the Danson-Nyquist-Hornbeck-Kukor case line's adop-
tion of the Rodriguez rational basis test provides an avenue for
states to follow when faced with school finance reform litigation
that seeks to cast education as a fundamental right, and is arguably
not dependent on a particular education clause. While state courts
naturally may decline to follow nonbinding Supreme Court ration-
ale construing the federal Constitution,10 7 the Rodriguez analysis
remains alive in school finance litigation.
101 Id. at 579.
10, Id. at 579-80.
103 Id. at 580-81.
10 Id. at 582-83.
"I, See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary School Dist.
No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
'6 See infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
'10 Commentators generally have noted the once expansive role state courts took in
constitutional jurisprudence. However, to a certain extent, that role diminished as the states
"tended to have a 'sorry' record in protecting individual rights." See Note, supra note 4,
at 1657-58.
Nevertheless, some commentators believe that trend to be reversing, with states once
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Undoubtedly, strict adherence to a "bright line" between leg-
islative and judicial functions in this field avoids criticism under
the separation of powers doctrine. 0 8 The courts should not impose
their own theories of education policy. However, if state courts
are to regain their prominent role of advancing individual rights,
as some commentators maintain, 1' 9 their decisions should not ig-
nore the basic and necessary role of an adequate education in
today's society. As a function of judicial authority, courts should
readily receive education reform cases, despite protestations of the
violation of separation of powers and the incapacity of the courts
to deal with certain constitutional questions." 0 As one commentator
noted,
While common sense may dictate an appropriate degree of sub-
stantive deference, the broad policies behind the concept of ju-
dicial review require that the judiciary exercise its function, even
again occupying a protective role regarding individual's rights. Most forcefully, the argument
continues that states are more representative of their citizens' values and as such more
political:
Because of state constitutions' unique nature and greater political accounta-
bility to the public will, state courts should not feel compelled to follow
blindly federal precedent when interpreting similar state constitutional provi-
sions. Instead, the courts should strive to develop their own independent modes
of analysis, taking into account such factors as the text of the state constitu-
tional provision and the state's history, in addition to the matter being liti-
gated.
Id. at 1658.
1-' This assumes that courts can readily discern the tri-partite structure in a functional
separation of powers analysis. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
'0 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
11 Dissenting Justice Liebson would have held the Kentucky education reform case to
be nonjusticiable, with the court precluded by the political question doctrine from under-
taking review. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 221.
Generally, the reasons given for a court's determination that a particular issue is
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine are,
(1) the inability of the judiciary to develop general principles and rules of
construction of a particular constitutional provision; (2) the judiciary's lack
of institutional capacity to review particular judgments of one or both of the
political branches; and (3) the judicial humility that flows from the judiciary's
inherently undemocratic nature ... [and] the fear that the judiciary's authority
and legitimacy will be undermined by a blatant disregard of its decision by
the political branches.
Redish, supra note 42, at 1043-44.
Professor Redish rejects such judicially protective rationales given for the political
question doctrine as "unduly narrow, short-sighted and even solipsistic view[s] of the
judiciary's function in a constitutional system." Id. at 1049. Instead, he asserts that as an
exercise of the ultimate judicial function, judicial review, courts should confront the "dif-
ficult" cases involving constitutional issues. Id. at 1050-51.
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if this results in an abandonment of rigid adherence to generalized
principle in favor of partially intuitive judgments on the issue of
necessity."'
Finally, as a part of the broad spectrum of judicial review, it
is argued that the judiciary's function and role in jurisprudence is
to decide "cases having a substantial 'political' component or
presenting difficult fundamental questions .. . focus[ing] on the
democratic nature of American government and law and on the
societal development at issue ... further[ing] societal development
with respect to the concerns in dispute."1 1 2
III. HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: STATE CASES
REJECTING THE RODRIGUEZ ANALYSIS
Prior to San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
California dealt with challenges to its state school finance system
on federal and state equal protection grounds, as well as under a
"common schools" education clause. '13 In Serrano v. Priest,"14 the
court evaluated a motion to dismiss petitioner's complaint." 5 Tak-
ing the allegations to be true, the court formulated the issue as
whether unequal per pupil funding violated the constitutional man-
date of a system of "common schools. 1 1 6 Although finding that
the education clause did not require equal spending per pupil,"17
the court held that where a child's education depended on the
affluence of the district in which she lived, a suspect class based
on wealth existed and a "strict scrutiny" test applied." 8 Local
Id. at 1050.
2Osgood, Bowsher v. Synar: Governmental Functions and Constitutional Doctrine:
The Historical Constitution, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 553, 588 (1987).
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
" 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The first Serrano case found a cause of
action averred by class action plaintiffs charging that the state education finance system
violated both federal and state equal protection guarantees. The court remanded the case
to give plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their allegations. The disposition of the case
under the fourteenth amendment was overturned by Rodriguez. However, on remand, the
court affirmed its holding under the California Constitution, article I, sections 11 and 21,
(state equal protection guarantees) that poorly funded districts were a suspect class and
local control formed no legitimate state interest. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1977) [hereinafter Serrano II].
"I Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 605 (1971) [hereinafter
Serrano 1].
116 Id. at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
7 Id. at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
'" Id. at 1260-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620-23.
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administrative control of school funds did not provide a compelling
state interest, where "fiscal freewill [was] a cruel illusion for the
poor school districts."" 9 Thus, the court found unequal spending
violative of both the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection
Clause and the state equal protection guarantee. 2 0
After remand of Serrano, the California legislature acted to
correct objectionable features of the funding system.12' In the in-
terim, the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, fore-
closing fourteenth amendment equal protection remedies.1 22
Nevertheless, the modified funding system failed "strict scrutiny"
under state equal protection analysis in the second Serrano case.'2
The majority concluded that under a "strict scrutiny" test, pres-
umptions of constitutionality afforded to legislative acts disap-
pear.' 24 The dissent argued that separation of powers required the
court to uphold the legislature: "So long as [it] has performed its
work in a manner consistent with overriding constitutional princi-
ples, [the court] must uphold its efforts regardless of our personal
views as to the fairness or wisdom of those legislative results.'" 125
While the dissent did not rely solely upon the separation of powers
question, 126 its concerns reflect the lingering doubts of those that
question judicial intrusion into educational matters. 2 7
Illustrating that state constitutional jurisprudence may differ
dramatically from federal constitutional construction, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court gave its response to school finance litigation,
thirteen days after the Rodriguez decision, in Robinson v. Cahill.28
The court discussed different constructions applicable to federal
equal protection and its state counterpart, finding that labels such
as "fundamental right," and "compelling state interest," do little
to aid equal protection analysis. 29 However, the particular balanc-
ing the court employed, "[A] court must weigh the nature of the
"I Id. at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
120 Id., 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
"2 Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 931-32, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
122 Id. at 949, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
2 Id. at 951-52, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68 (1977).
124 Id. at 957, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
2 Id. at 958-59, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 959, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
27 See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-53 (1973).
120 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
"I Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973)
[hereinafter Robinson 1].
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restraint . . . against the apparent public justification,"' 30 appears
scarcely different from the Rodriguez rational basis test. The court
declined to hold the New Jersey funding scheme unconstitutional
under the state equal protection clause, noting "[T]he equal pro-
tection clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply
categorical answers in the vast area of human needs . .. "3'
Finding education to be "vital" rather than "fundamental"
under the New Jersey constitution, 132 the court turned instead to
the state's education clause, which mandates a "thorough and
efficient" system of public schools, to declare the school finance
program unconstitutional. 33 The court concluded that the framers
adopting the education clause had equal educational opportunity
in mind, as opposed to equality among state taxpayers. 34 Because
the court was not offered another means to gauge whether the
state school system met the constitutional mandate of a "thorough
and efficient" system, the court found that discrepancies in per
pupil funding, based on local property values, did not meet con-
stitutional muster. 135 Noting that it could not "unravel the fiscal
skein,' 1 36 the court reserved jurisdiction to hear arguments on
whether it could order distribution of funds appropriated by the
legislature without violating the separation of powers doctrine. 137
Subsequently, the court decided it could direct distribution of funds
consistent with separation of powers. 38
Ironically, the court cited the second Serrano decision for the
proposition that equality measured by the "needs" of pupils would
be judicially unmanageable while equality in dollar amounts would
not. 39 Reviewing the history of the Robinson litigation,' 4° one
130 Id.
" Id. at 283.
Id. at 284. Subsequently, the New Jersey court construed the "thorough and
efficient" education clause to afford a fundamental right to education. Robinson v. Cahill,
351 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Robinson 11].
"I Robinson 1, 303 A.2d at 294.
11 Id. at 294.
" Id. at 295.
136 Id. at 298.
1' Id.
,3, See Robinson II, 351 A.2d 713.
"9 Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 278.
"- To call the Robinson history never ending may not be an overstatement. Robinson
has been before the New Jersey Supreme Court seven times over thirteen years. See Robinson
1, 303 A.2d 273; Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 335
A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson II, 351 A.2d 713; Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J.
1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400
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wonders whether the same can be said for the court's attempt to
oversee school funding schemes. In one of its many decisions, 4'
the court expressed an unwillingness to intrude into the legislative
process. 42 However, the court found that an exigency existed with
no constitutional system of financing and no concomitant admin-
istrative processes in place before the coming school year. 143 The
court thus limited its intrusion as a last resort in an effort to
comport with the separation of powers doctrine.'" While the entire
question of education policy is arguably best left to legislatures, 45
the court may have been correct when it stated:
If then, the right of children to a thorough and efficient system
of education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the [New
Jersey] Constitution, . . . it follows that the court must "afford
an appropriate remedy to redress a violation of those rights. To
find otherwise would be to say that our Constitution embodies
rights in a vacuum, existing only on paper."'
As the court indicates, where a legislature fails to meet its
constitutional duty, the judiciary may be wholly justified in invad-
ing its domain. However, the saga of the Robinson litigation also
foretells the dangers of judicial intervention into education policy.
Such dangers exist, ranging from a decreased expectancy of the
judiciary as an effective problem solving institution to the concerns_
of the court itself with respect to conservation of judicial resources.
But, avoiding difficult decisions because of general institutional
concerns ignores the court's function and duty to exercise judicial
review. 47 Such abdication would then make the Robinson court
correct that rights would exist "in a vacuum."' ' 48
(N.J. 1976). For a discussion of the Robinson litigation impact, see Tractenberg, Reforming
School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 365 (1974); Tractenberg, The Thorough and Efficient Clause, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 312 (1973); Ruvoldt, Educational Financing in New Jersey: Robinson v.
Cahill and Beyond, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1973).
'1' Robinson II, 351 A.2d 713.
141 Id. at 718.
'4 Id.
I" Id. at 723.
,41 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 50-53. As commentators have noted: "It is an axiom of
American government that the legislature holds the purse strings ... This is traditionally
viewed as the means by which the representatives of the people hold their most powerful
check and balance on the executive branch." Snyder & Ireland, supra note 40, at 225.
" Robinson II, 351 A.2d at 720.
',' See Redish, supra note 42, at 1061.
141 Robinson II, 351 A.2d at 720.
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Recognizing that provisions of a state constitution may require
higher standards of protection than its federal counterpart, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled its state school
funding scheme unconstitutional in Pauley v. Kelly. 149 The court
declined to follow Rodriguez and criticized the Supreme Court for
its failure to recognize education as a "fundamental right."' 50
Inspired by the Robinson litigation,' the plaintiffs in Pauley suc-
cessfully argued that West Virginia's "thorough and efficient"
education clause gave a "fundamental right" to education, which
under state equal protection was not overcome by a "compelling
state interest" of local control.5 2 The decision in Pauley broadened
Robinson by defining a "thorough and efficient" education as;
"[one which] develops, as best the state of education expertise
allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to
prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and
citizenship, and does so economically.' '1 53
The court dismissed any possible separation of powers concerns
by maintaining, "[Clourts are not concerned with the wisdom or
policy of the legislation. ''- 4 Rather, the question upon review was
whether the legislation "ha[d] a reasonable relation to the thorough
and efficient mandate.' 1 55 The court would only intrude into tra-
ditional legislative functions when legislation "is offensive to ju-
dicial notions about what a thorough and efficient education system
may be.' ' 156
While the Robinson court believed in some judicial restraint in
traditional legislative fields, the Pauley court criticized the New
Jersey Supreme Court's restraint in application of equal protection
guarantees. 157 Instead, the Pauley court noted that equal protection
in the education field, "must mean an equality in substantive
educational offerings and results, no matter what the expenditures
are.''
58
149 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (W. Va. 1979). For a discussion of differences in state and
federal constitutional interpretations, see supra note 107.
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 863-64 n.5 (W.Va. 1979).
' For a discussion of that litigation, see supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
,,2 Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 864.
W Id. at 877.
'1 Id. at 870.
155 Id.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 865 n.7.
IS$ Id.
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The court's holding in Pauley did not invade a legislative
function. Rather, it merely passed upon the constitutionality of the
education system as determined through the court's responsibility
as constitutional interpreter. Although the court's language could
be read broadly to mean that the judiciary might determine public
school policy routinely, thus violating the province of the executive
and legislative branches, 15 9 questions of education management are
best left to the legislature, following a court's adjudication of a
constitutional guarantee of equal education.
One reason given for a court's reluctance to intrude into polit-
ical/legislative fields is the inadequacy of standards by which to
guide lower courts. 160 To its discredit, the Pauley court's broad
definition of "thorough and efficient" does not set specific meas-
ures by which to gauge the quality of West Virginia education.
However, the "absence of standards" criticism ignores the judi-
ciary's function of judicial review in favor of more limited insti-
tutional concerns.1 61
A. The Place of the Serrano-Robinson-Pauley Line in School
Finance Reform
Undoubtedly, Serrano and its progeny breathed life into school
finance reform litigation in the wake of the Rodriguez decision. 16 2
These cases support the argument that state constitutional jurispru-
dence may take a leading role in placing higher standards on equal
protection. 63 However, as the previous discussion suggests, their
rationales are left open to attack on separation of powers grounds,
thus potentially lessening the appeal of their reasoning. Of course,
constitutional interpretation seldom remains static' 4 and is subject
to differing views by state judiciaries. 65 The lasting impression
from these decisions is that the separation of powers doctrine is a
minimum hurdle to overcome in school funding cases. The Pauley
court crossed the threshold by framing the issue as simply an
" See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
11 See Redish, supra note 42, at 1060. Professor Redish rejects this rationale, main-
taining that any constitutional provision can be supplied with workable standards of inter-
pretation. Id. at 1047.
161 Id. at 1050-51.
162 See generally Thro, supra note 3 (predicting new hope and optimism in school
finance reform cases); Note, supra note 4.
"6 See supra note 107.
1' Id.
165 Id.
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interpretation of "thorough and efficient."' The New Jersey court
felt compelled to intrude into a traditional legislative function only
after finding an exigency. 67 As the Serrano-Robinson-Pauley line
of cases indicates, separation of powers is hardly fatal to school
finance challenges. The argument to overcome separation of powers
concerns rests on the courts' function of judicial review. Once the
state court finds education to be a fundamental right, it is axio-
matic that the court may "decide cases which involve consideration
of deeply ingrained social attitudes or prejudices"1 68 in spite of
contrary doctrinal arguments.
IV. RECENT SCHOOL FINANCE CASES: EDUCATION AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
It was against the backdrop of prior school funding litigation
that the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc., considered "whether the Kentucky General As-
sembly ha[d] complied with its constitutional mandate to 'provide
an efficient system of public schools throughout the state."''1
69
Based on the framers' intent, 70 the court found education a "fun-
damental right.' ' 7' Additionally, the courf found the goal of an
"efficient" education clause to be a "system hav[ing] the twin
attributes of uniformity and equality.' ' 72 The court, like the trial
judge, could have turned to equal guaranty provisions in the Ken-
tucky constitution to find the school finance system unconstitu-
tional.173 However, for some inexplicable reason, the court declined
to do so. Instead, the court framed the issue as whether Kentucky's
finance system was "efficient.' ' 74 The court noted the overall
"6 Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 887.
167 Robinson II, 351 A.2d at 718.
"I Osgood, supra note 112, at 589.
10 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989).
110 Consider the comments of Delegate Moore, as quoted by the Rose Court:
Common schools make patriots and men who are willing to stand upon a
common land. The boys of the humble mountain home stand equally high
with those from the mansions of the city. There are no distinctions in the
common schools, but all stand upon one level.
Id. at 206 (citation omitted).
M Id. at 203-06.
172 Id. at 207.
"' See KY. CONST. §§ 2-3.
,7 The court listed a summary of what "efficient" requires:
1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Ken-
tucky is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly.
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inadequacy of the schools, as delineated by education experts,
through Kentucky's rankings among benchmark states and the past
failure of the General Assembly to provide for the schools. 75 The
court had little trouble finding the Kentucky funding scheme un-
constitutional, where unequal per pupil funding implicated unequal
educational opportunities. 7 6
Throughout its opinion, the Kentucky court addressed the sep-
aration of powers issue, maintaining, "We do not instruct the
General Assembly to enact any specific legislation ... [or] to raise
taxes .... We only decide the nature of the constitutional man-
date. We only determine the intent of the framers. Carrying out
that intent is the duty of the General Assembly.' ' 7 7 Taking their
cue from Pauley v. Kelly, 7 8 the plaintiffs argued that there is
broad judicial power to determine what is "offensive to judicial
notions about what a thorough and efficient education system
is.''1 79 The court declined to follow Pauley's broad approach to
the separation of powers doctrine. Instead, the court, based on
Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 80 held that the doc-
trine must be "strictly construed." '' 8' Separation of powers restric-
tions on the court were satisfied where no "specific legislation" or
tax increase was ordered. 82 However, the court found that the trial
2) Common schools shall be free to all.
3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children.
4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state.
5) Common schools shall provide equal education opportunities to all Kentucky
children, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstances.
6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure
that they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and
with no political influence.
7) The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in
Kentucky have a constitutional right to an adequate education.
8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide
each child in Kentucky an adequate education.
9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the
seven capacities recited previously.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13.
M" Id. at 213.
176 Id. at 211-212.
,,Id. at 212.
,7 See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
'" Brief for Appellees at 55, Rose v. Council For Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989)(No. 88-SC-804-TG).
'- 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984). For a discussion of the separation of powers analysis
under Brown, see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
181 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.
112 Id. at 214.
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judge's retention of jurisdiction and supervision of the General
Assembly's efforts violated separation of powers under the "strongly
written, definitive constitutional scheme."' 183
Justice Liebson dissented from the majority holding on the
grounds that the court violated both the separation of powers and
political question doctrines. 184 Although the dissenting justiceagreed
that the General Assembly had failed to provide an "efficient"
public school system, Justice Liebson felt that the judgment should
be reversed because the issue was nonjusticiable in that there was
no "actual controversy."'' s5 Citing Baker v. Carr'16 as the touch-
stone of the political question doctrine and its relationship to
separation of powers, Justice Liebson's principal concern was that
the court declared the entire school funding system unconstitu-
tional, rather than any specific statutes.8 7 Justice Liebson wrote:
[I]n asking that we declare the system unconstitutional but not
the statutes, they were presenting us with a "Gordian" knot ...,
thus presenting us with an insolvable, nonjusticiable dilemma.
And, we have responded with what could be expected when you
open Pandora's box, an Opinion which at the same time declares
everything unconstitutional and nothing unconstitutional.88
Liebson feared that the judiciary did not have the capacity to
examine the issue because the court would go too far in an area
of constitutional law where standards are difficult to formulate. 8 9
Thus, Justice Liebson placed the institutional concerns of the court
over its functional role of constitutional interpreter. 90 In that re-
spect, the justice's argument proves too much. As has been noted:
"[The Judiciary] has never been at a loss to decipher workable
standards for the vaguest of constitutional provisions when it so
desires. ' 19'
During the period when Rose was working its way through the
Kentucky courts, Montana was grappling with a constitutional
"I Id. at 214; see also Ky. CONST. §§ 27-28 (specifying separation of powers).
114 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 224, 228-29 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 223-25 (Liebson, J., dissenting); see also Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
897 (W.Va. 1979) (Neely, J., dissenting) (arguing that educational funding is best left to
the legislature where the court is without proper standards to resolve the issue).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 223-24 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
I~ Id. at 224 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
219 See Redish, supra note 42, at 1050-51.
' See id.
93 Id. at 1060.
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challenge to its 1985-86 school funding program. 192 In Helena El-
ementary School District No. 1 v. State,193 the court ruled that
Montana's education clause, which provides that "equality of ed-
ucational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of this state,"
was violated upon a showing of funding disparities./94 Given the
clause's guarantee of equal educational opportunity, the court did
not reach the question of whether funding violated state equal
protection, nor the question of whether education is a "fundamen-
tal right.11 95 Highlighting what the court considered to be elements
of qualitatively equal education,' 96 the court recognized that the
legislature "has the power to increase or reduce various parts of
these elements, and in addition to add other elements for [public
school] funding.' 197 The court declined, however, to "spell out the
percentages ... required on the part of the State under the [school
funding program] ... [where the] control of such funds is pri-
marily in the Legislature.' 98
Hence, the court in Helena reviewed the legislative funding
statutes under its role as constitutional interpreter, while recogniz-
ing the traditional legislative function of controlling the purse. 199
In this regard, the Helena court went no further than the Kentucky
court did in Rose.200
Later in 1989, Texas, in Edgewood Independent School District
v. Kirby, handed down its ruling that state school funding pro-
grams were unconstitutional. 20 1 As in Rose, the education clause at
issue required "an efficient system of public free schools.' '202 The
Texas Supreme Court overruled the lower court's holding that the
challenge involved was a "political question not suitable for judicial
"2 Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont. 1989).
01 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
194 Id. at 689.
191 Id. at 691.
196 The court noted:
There are a number of additional factors which are a significant part of the
education of each person in Montana, including but not limited to such
elements as individual teachers, classroom size, support of the parents of
students, and the desire and motivation on the part of the student which
moves him or her to seek earnestly after an education.
Id.
19 Id.
198 Id.
'9 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-91 and accompanying text.
20 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
2 Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
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review.' '203 As other state judiciaries have done,204 the Texas court
held, "[T]his is not an area in which the Constitution vests exclu-
sive discretion in the Legislature. ' 20 5 Citing Rose and decisions
from eight other states, 206 the court limited its holding to construc-
tion of the constitutional mandate and, like the Kentucky court,
"[did] not ... instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the
legislation it should enact; nor [did the court] order it to raise
taxes." 2
0 7
As in the Rose and Helena decisions, the Texas court engaged
in constitutional interpretation, but complied with the separation
of powers doctrine by ruling solely on the constitutional mandate
at issue and not ordering specific legislation.208 Constitutional in-
terpretation will often greatly affect the other branches' functions.
However, to refuse to examine a constitutional issue because of
deference to political/legislative functions, as flexible as those terms
may be in this field of constitutional law, goes too far toward
abrogating the traditional duty of judicial review.20 9
A. The Addition of the Rose-Helena-Edgewood Decisions to
School Finance Reform Litigation
By "strictly" adhering to constitutional provisions of separa-
tion of powers, Rose indicates that courts will do more than simply
give lip service to the separation of powers doctrine. Although the
court did not order a tax increase or specific legislation, thus
technically meeting the court's separation of powers analysis, the
breadth of the court's decision left the legislature few options other
than to enact new school legislation and tax increases. 210 The Rose
court held:
"I Id. at 394.
2 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Rose, 790
S.W.2d 186; Helena Elementary, 769 P.2d 684; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d 859.
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394.
Id. at 398. The Texas court cited: DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d
90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano, 487 P.2d 1241; Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977);
Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; Helena Elementary, 769 P.2d 684; Robinson, 303 A.2d 273; Seattle
School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Paule, 255 S.E.2d 859; Washakie
County School Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824
(1980).
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 399.
See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
See Redish, supra note 42, at 1050.
210 The trial judge, Ray Corns, strongly intimated that, in his view, the General
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Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is that Ken-
tucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitutional ....
This decision applies to the statutes creating, implementing and
financing the system and to all regulations, etc., pertaining thereto.
This decision covers the creation of local school districts, school
boards, and the Kentucky Department of Education to the Min-
imum Foundation Program and Power Equalization Program. It
covers school construction and maintenance, teacher certifica-
tion-the whole gamut of the common school system in Ken-
tucky.21'
Arguably, this broad holding does more than project the framers'
intent regarding an "efficient" school system, implying that sepa-
ration of powers is not a restriction on judicial power to define
constitutional terms. Certainly, the doctrine did not prevent the
court from defining constitutional terms in such a manner as to
cause the revamping of an entire legislated educational system.
The future in this field remains unclear. Kentucky has just
begun to implement some of the changes mandated by Rose.21 2
Nevertheless, Rose presents a new beginning to education finance
reform, which may be particularly extensive given the broad inval-
idation of an entire public education system. 2 3 The Rose-Helena-
Edgewood decisions add additional weight to general theories of
expanded state constitutional jurisprudence. 21 4 These cases, relying
solely upon state education clauses to make their sweeping changes,
signify the potential for a new revolution in school finance litiga-
tion. 25
The decisions in Rose, Helena, and Edgewood make clear that
the separation of powers doctrine will not necessarily act as an
impediment to education finance reform litigation. Separation of
powers remains a minimal obstacle to overcome, if an obstacle at
Assembly was left with little choice but to raise taxes to properly fund an "efficient" system
of common schools. Council for Better Educ. v. Wilkinson, No. 85-CI-1759, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment at 13 (Ky. Franklin Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 1988).
211 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215 (emphasis in original).
212 The full impact of the Rose decision has not yet been felt. However, the Kentucky
education reforms have been heralded as a model for other states, with the process receiving
passing grades in meeting its first year goals. Haas, First-Year Goals Attained in Education
Reform, Cincinnati Enquirer, Mar. 3, 1991, § B at 3, col. 1. Colorado's governor recently
heralded Kentucky's lead in education reform. Lexington Herald-Leader, Jan. 5, 1991, § C
at 1, col. 5.
2M3 Thro, supra note 3, at 238-40.
214 See supra note 107.
21 Thro, supra note 3, at 250.
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all, where courts rightly exercise their roles in constitutional con-
struction. A court, in its separation of power analysis, will look to
traditional functions of the different branches in making its find-
ings. 2 6 In doing so, the court will perform its function of consti-
tutional interpretation. 217 Classifying a government function as
legislative, executive, or judicial in a separation of powers "judg-
ment by labels" analysis presents some difficulty. 218 Nonetheless,
wholesale deference to another branch's function at the expense of
settling a difficult constitutional question reduces judicial power
and lowers public expectations by expending the court's "moral
capital. "219 As one commentator noted:
Indeed, there are times when it seems that there is nothing be-
tween the potential tyranny of the political branches and the
liberty of the people but a vigilant judicial branch. It is to be
hoped if not expected that the judiciary will have the intelligence,
good will, and judgment not to go the way of all fleshY. 0
CONCLUSION
State constitutional jurisprudence, allowing a constitutional
guarantee of an equal education, may be applauded for this result
in education finance reform litigation. As this Note indicates,
courts are no longer constrained by notions of judicial deference
to the legislative branches for fear of violating separation of powers
and the related political question doctrine. Assuming a court can
undertake "judgment by labels,"'22 strict adherence to traditional
legislative or executive roles precludes a court from judicially de-
fining a qualitatively adequate education. 2 2 As the individual case
histories convey, such judicial intrusions are fraught with the dan-
ger of seemingly endless litigation and problems of judicial man-
agement. 223 While the proclamation of constitutionally guaranteed
educational equality may herald the coming of a new age, in
practice, it remains an elusive goal.2 2 4 Under the factors promul-
216 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
21 See Redish, supra note 42, at 1050.
2I Kurland, supra note 23, at 593.
219 See Redish, supra note 42, at 1053-54.
21 Kurland, supra note 23, at 611.
22, Id. at 593.
222 See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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gated in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. ,25 questions
may again arise as to what an equal education really is.226
While Kukor v. Grover2 7 indicates that the separation of pow-
ers doctrine may still cause a court to be reluctant to proclaim
guarantees of educational equality, out of concern over the tradi-
tional role of legislatures, the better and more responsive approach
follows from Rose. The Kentucky court fulfilled separation of
powers proscriptions by adhering to a narrowly defined "strict"
functional construction of separation of powers. To its credit, the
court did not fall prey to judicial avoidance of a difficult consti-
tutional decision by citing its own inadequacy to deal effectively
with the issue. Rather than deny plaintiffs the opportunity to
litigate unfair school fund distribution, the courtroom doors re-
mained open. Avoiding the broad language of Pauley v. Kelly,
that found unconstitutional legislation "offensive to judicial no-
tions about what a[n] .. .efficient education system is,' '22 Rose
struck a balance that comports with the separation of powers
doctrine in spirit, if not in actual effect.
Troy Reynolds
" See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
Questions of how equal is equal are elusive. If schools in Lexington, a well funded
district, offer French in elementary grades, must Eastern Kentucky schools, which made up
the Council for Better Education, Inc. in Rose, offer similar courses? Such concerns
influenced the Rodriguez Court in declining to rule-on the right to education issue out of
deference to state legislators and education experts. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 53 (1973).
The Rose court addressed this problem by imposing on the General Assembly the
constitutional duty to adequately fund and supervise a system of common schools "sub-
stantially uniform throughout the state." Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). The emphasis was on equal funding, whereby "The children
of the poor and the children of the rich, the children who live in the poor districts and the
children who live in the rich districts must be given the same opportunity and access to an
adequate education." Id.
-1 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 871 (W. Va. 1979).
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